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the body. It is the bearer not only of the past and present, but it is pregnant with the future.

Inasmuch as we must account for the difference in meaning or in mental activity by the greater complexity on the part of the energetic or physiological conditions, there can be no use in speaking of subconscious mental activity. The test of whether processes are conscious or not must be empirical. Conscious processes are, no doubt, conditioned all the while upon non-conscious processes, but nothing is gained by calling the latter subconscious.

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“TRUTH” VERSUS “TRUTHFULNESS”

MY account of truth is purely logical and relates to its definition only. I contend that you can not tell what the word “true” means, as applied to a statement, without invoking the concept of the statement’s workings.

Assume, to fix our ideas, a universe composed of two things only: imperial Cæsar dead and turned to clay, and me, saying “Cæsar really existed.” Most persons would naïvely deem truth to be thereby uttered, and say that by a sort of *actio in distans* my statement had taken direct hold of the other fact.

But have my words so certainly denoted *that* Cæsar?—or so certainly connoted *his* individual attributes? To fill out the complete measure of what the epithet “true” may ideally mean, my thought ought to bear a fully determinate and unambiguous “one-to-one-relation” to its own particular object. In the ultra simple universe imagined the reference is uncertified. Were there two Cæsars we shouldn’t know which was meant. The conditions of truth thus seem incomplete in this universe, so that it must be enlarged.

Transcendentalists enlarge it by invoking an absolute mind which, as it owns all the facts, can sovereignly correlate them. If it intends that my statement *shall* refer to that identical Cæsar, and that the attributes I have in mind *shall* mean his attributes, that intention suffices to make the statement true.

I, in turn, enlarge the universe by admitting finite intermediaries between the two original facts. Cæsar *had*, and my statement *has*, effects; and if these effects in any way run together, a concrete medium and bottom is provided for the determinate cognitive relation, which, as a pure *actio in distans*, seemed to float too vaguely and unintelligibly.

The real Cæsar, for example, wrote a manuscript of which I see

a real reprint, and say "the Cæsar I mean is the author of *that*." The "workings" of my thought thus determine both its denotative and its connotative significance more fully. It now defines itself as neither irrelevant to the real Cæsar, nor false in what it suggests of him. The absolute mind, seeing me thus working towards Cæsar through the cosmic intermediaries, might well say: "Such workings only specify in detail what I meant myself by the statement being true. I decree the cognitive relation between the two original facts to mean that just that kind of concrete chain of intermediaries exists or can exist."

But the chain involves facts prior to the statement the logical conditions of whose truth we are defining, and facts subsequent to it; and this circumstance, coupled with the vulgar employment of the terms truth and fact as synonyms, has laid my account open to misapprehension. "How," it is confusedly asked, "can Cæsar's existence, a truth already 2,000 years old, depend for its truth on anything about to happen now? How can my acknowledgment of it be made true by the acknowledgment's own effects? The effects may indeed confirm my belief, but the belief was made true already by the fact that Cæsar really did exist."

Well, be it so, for if there were no Cæsar, there could, of course, be no positive truth about him—but then distinguish between "true" as being positively and completely so established, and "true" as being so only "practically," elliptically, and by courtesy, in the sense of not being positively irrelevant or untrue. Remember also that Cæsar's having existed in fact may make a present statement false or irrelevant as well as it may make it true, and that in neither case does it itself have to alter. It being given, whether truth, untruth, or irrelevancy shall be also given depends on something pertaining to the statement itself. What "pragmatism" contends for is that you can not adequately define the something if you leave the notion of the statement's functional workings out of your account. Truth meaning agreement with reality, the mode of the agreeing is a practical problem which the subjective term of the relation alone can solve.

People, mixing history with the purely logical inquiry, and falling into inveterate habits of speech, will still say: "The statement is true anyhow, true in advance, born true, true apart from any of its workings, and the workings are themselves determined by that prior truth." This notion of an immanent or inherent truth, meaning a truth with only a part of the constituents of its full definition realized in fact, is, of course, indispensable in practical life. Millions of statements there *pass* for true, for one that lives up to what the full concept implies.

Would it satisfy the repudiators of the fuller definition if we agreed to let them keep the word "true" for what they stickle for so exclusively, namely, the more preliminary and objective conditions of the cognitive relation—so that for any words about Cæsar to be true in that lopped and truncated sense it would suffice that Cæsar should have really existed—while the word "truthful" should be reserved, as having the more concrete sound, for the entire unmutated notion for which Mr. Schiller and I contend?

Mr. Schiller and I would then appear as fighting the battles of truthfulness against truth. The question would be almost purely academic, for in actual life the true and the truthful would usually denote the same body of actual human statements or beliefs. Even now none of the *facts* which either party emphasizes has ever been denied by the other party, and the quarrel might have the bottom knocked out of it altogether, so far as it related to truth's definition only, by the invention of this or some other pair of new technical terms.

The friends of "truth" would still have to admit, however, that "truthfulness" is the more plenary and fundamental notion, that it includes the whole of "truth" and supplements its deficiencies, and alone defines adequately what correct and perfect knowledge may mean.

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DISCUSSION

PROVISIONAL AND ETERNAL TRUTH

DR. ADAMS treats my little article "Sub Specie Æternitatis" with so much sympathetic courtesy that I venture to say another word in defense of my position. And first let me say that the term which I took for a title was used ironically, with no wish to belittle a phrase of so much dignity and quality. The protest which I entered was against claiming eternal validity for particular theories about existence, which have been produced under conditions of actual history.

I find it a little hard to believe that scientists all continue to conceive their purpose as the discovery of the "real" constitution of things in the sense advocated by Dr. Adams, if I have understood. Recent years have wrought a marked change in this matter. Such a book as Poincaré's "Science and Hypothesis" is no isolated phenomenon. Professor J. J. Thomson writes at the beginning of his recent book, "The Corpuscular Theory of Matter,"¹ that in

¹ I depend for this reference upon the review in the *Athenæum* of December 28, 1907, p. 829.